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Abstract
This paper regards the development of an analytical redundancy-based approach for detecting and isolating both
sensor and actuator faults in flat inland navigation canals. Inland navigation networks are principally used for transport
and are composed of many canalized natural rivers and artificial canals characterized by no slope. These canals
are strongly affected by resonance phenomena, which can create waves such that the navigation condition might not
be guaranteed. It is therefore required to ensure dealing with fault-free measured data and actuators. The proposed
approach is based on the Integrator Delay Zero (IDZ) model of the flat inland navigation canal. The proposed method
is tested by considering the Cuinchy-Fontinettes navigation reach (in the north of France) to detect and isolate the
occurrence of faults in the Cuinchy and Fontinettes level sensors and in the Cuinchy gate.
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1 Introduction
Inland navigation systems extend over more than 37,000
km in Europe. An intensification of their use for transport
purposes is expected in the not-too-distant future; indeed,
this transport mode offers economical and environmental
benefits over road transport1. In addition, this increase in the
demand of inland waterways transport will take place in a
context of climate change, which will naturally constrain its
management; in particular, the water resources allocated to
navigation.
Inland navigation networks can be considered as large-
scale systems composed of natural canalized rivers and
artificial canals, equipped with locks that make possible to
navigate along them. However, their operation creates waves
that not only disturb the water levels but also travel back and
forth along the water stream (resonance phenomena), only
attenuating after several hours. This behavior is especially
critical for those reaches that are characterized by no bottom
slope (flat reaches).
These networks are usually modeled using a decompo-
sition in several reaches to facilitate the modeling task. A
natural way to partition these systems is to consider portions
of the water stream between two locks or gates, which
are called navigation reaches. Their management aims at
maintaining the water level around a setpoint known as the
Normal Navigation Level (NNL). The allowed fluctuation of
the water level is defined by means of the Higher Navigation
Level (HNL) and the Lower Navigation Level (LNL). When
the measured water level crosses one of these boundaries
in any reach, the navigation of vessels must stop. Figure 1
illustrates this situation.
In addition, any error provided by a failure in a level sensor
or a gate can lead to inefficient water and navigation control.
Therefore, sensor and actuator fault diagnosis represents an
important issue for inland navigation systems monitoring and
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Figure 1. NNL and navigation rectangle.
supervision. This topic has attracted considerable attention
in the past years, and an extense body of literature dedicated
to fault diagnosis of water systems has been produced. For
instance, an H∞ observer was designed for time-varying
systems, which generated residuals sensitive to some faults
and insensitive to others, aiming at isolating faults on the
regulation gates of a canal2. A fault diagnosis architecture
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was proposed to distinguish offtake, water level sensor and
gate faults in irrigation canals3. A reconfigurable distributed
LQG controller was designed to ensure the navigability of
the canals in the presence of both sensor and actuator faults4.
A fuzzy residual diagnosis strategy based on analytical
redundancy was developed to detect and isolate faults on
sensors in an urban water supply network5. A mathematical
framework suitable for fault diagnosis and security in
water systems was derived while dealing with the sensor
placement problem in large-scale drinking water distribution
networks6.
In this work, a model-based passive robust fault diagnosis
method is proposed, aiming at detecting and isolating
possible sensor and actuator fault that can occur in inland
waterways. The model is based on the Saint-Venant partial
differential equations7, which can accurately represent the
dynamics of a navigation reach. However, these nonlinear
differential equations cannot be solved analytically, being
only possible a numerical solution, they are extremely
sensitive to errors in the physical parameters and not
well suited for control purposes8. All these reasons have
fostered the development of simplified models, which are
obtained by linearizing this set of equations around a certain
operating point. One of the first attempts at finding a suitable
simplified model was the Integrator Delay (ID) model9,
which was later improved by considering an additional
zero in the model, leading to the Integrator Delay Zero
(IDZ) model10. More recently, the Integrator Resonance (IR)
model11 was conceived for free-surface water systems whose
dynamics are characterized by the resonance phenomena. In
addition, grey-box12–14 and black-box15 models have also
been proposed to deal with navigation reaches for which the
physical parameters are not well known.
The present work uses the IDZ model. Many examples
can be found in the literature that make use of it for fault
diagnosis purposes; it is indeed an important issue for inland
navigation systems because an error provided by a sensor
could lead to navigation disruption16. For instance, it was
used to detect and isolate sensor faults in combination with
a pattern recognition method17: the IDZ model (nominal
model) and the interval outputs (coming from the interval
model) were used as features for the classification algorithm.
Another work sought to diagnose sensor faults in the
Cuinchy-Fontinettes reach (CFr)18 in the north of France.
The same reach was also considered in order to develop a
diagnosis approach for sensor and actuator faults19.
The CFr has served in many works as the case study
to illustrate the proposed approaches. Indeed, it constitutes
an important reach in the inland navigation network in the
north of France. First of all, its location allows to control
the water dispatch among the three major water catchments
in the region. In addition, this reach is equipped with the
biggest lock in terms of size and dispatched water volume
in a single lock operation. Due to the dimensions of this
lock, the dynamics of the CFr are particularly impacted by
resonance phenomena. For all these reasons, it is crucial to
ensure that all the possible faults in the CFr can be detected
and isolated.
The first efforts towards diagnosing sensor and actuator
faults in the CFr were carried out19: some hints about the
modeling step were given and the diagnosis approach was
proposed, but it was only tested for a subset of all the possible
faults that can impact the system. However, in this paper the
modeling methodology is detailed and the expressions of the
IDZ parameters are explicitly given by considering specific
features of flat navigation reaches. Furthermore, a global
fault diagnosis approach is designed to detect and isolate
all the possible sensor and actuator faults that can affect the
system. The case study section is devoted to verify that the
proposed methodology achieves the desired performance.
The structure of this paper is as follows: the description of
the system, the management objectives and the constraints on
the navigation conditions are presented in Section 2. The IDZ
model is described in Section 3 and the necessary parameter
expressions based on physical principles are given. Certain
simplifications can be carried out due to the fact that the CFr
is a flat reach, hence the uniform dynamics are not present
in this scenario. Section 4 is dedicated to the presentation of
the fault diagnosis method. Finally, Section 5 gathers all the
possible faulty scenarios and illustrates them by considering
the CFr as the case study, highlighting the performance of
the proposed methodology. Finally, the conclusions that stem
from this work are given in Section 6.
2 Problem statement
The largest inland navigation network in France is located
in the north of the country. It is composed of more than 50
navigation reaches connected through locks. Some of these
navigation reaches are artificial canals, which is the case of
the CFr. Figure 2 depicts part of this network.
Figure 2. Schematic view of a part of the inland navigation
network in the north of France.
This reach is equipped with the lock of Cuinchy at
the upstream end and with the lock of Fontinettes at the
downstream end. A lock operation in Cuinchy implies a
water volume input of 3,700 m3 to the CFr, while a lock
operation in Fontinettes corresponds to an output volume of
25,000 m3. As the volume outputs are significantly larger
than the inputs, it is necessary to balance the water volumes
that have been exchanged with the adjacent reaches during
navigation periods. For this purpose, the CFr has been
equipped with a controlled gate in Cuinchy, which is used to
supply the CFr. The daily period of navigation corresponds
to 14 hours, starting from 6 a.m. The water volume balance
takes place once the navigation has stopped.
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Figure 3. Schematic view of the CFr.
The CFr is characterized by no slope, a length of 42, 3 km,
a width of 52 m and a variable profile geometry, which can
be simplified by considering an average rectangular profile
(see Fig. 3).
The management of the CFr consists in maintaining the
water level within 3.8 (i.e. the NNL) ± 0.05 m. These
boundaries correspond to the navigation rectangle. If the
water level crosses the navigation rectangle, the navigation
has to stop. These strong constraints on the water levels
require the implementation of efficient control algorithms
and fault diagnosis methodologies.
A fault diagnosis method is therefore designed in order
to detect and isolate faults that can occur on the Cuinchy
and Fontinettes level sensors and on the Cuinchy gate. This
approach is based on the IDZ model of the CFr. The steps
involved in the estimation of the IDZ parameters for flat,
free-surface reaches is presented next.
3 Modeling of flat navigation canals
Many linearized models that can be used to describe the
dynamics of water networks have been mentioned in the
introduction. These models link the measured water depths
and the discharges at the boundaries of a reach. In general,
the following relationship can be considered:[
y(0, s)
y(L, s)
]
=
[
p11(s) p12(s)
p21(s) p22(s)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
P(s)
[
q(0, s)
q(L, s)
]
, (1)
where 0 and L are the abscissas for the initial and final
ends of the canal; y(0, s) and y(L, s), the upstream and
downstream water levels; q(0, s) and q(L, s), the upstream
inflow and downstream outflow; and pij(s), the different
terms of the linearized model.
Among all these possibilities, in this work the IDZ
model is used because of its simplicity and its capability to
characterize the dynamics of the reaches with high accuracy
in all regimes. It consists of an integrator, a delay and a
zero: while the two first terms reproduce the low frequencies
behavior, the zero accounts for the high frequencies. Its
structure is as follows:
pij(s) =
zijs+ 1
Aijs e
−τijs, (2)
where z represents the inverse of the zero, A the integrator
gain and τ the propagation time delay. It is not possible to
obtain the exact values of these parameters; however, they
can be precisely approximated10. Since the used parameters
are an estimation of the theoretical ones, the notation pˆij
replaces pij hereinafter. The integrator gain accounts for the
volume change according to the variation of the water level.
The time delay represents the required time for a wave to
travel from its origin to the measurement points (therefore
τ11 = τ22 = 0). Finally, the zero approximates through a
constant gain the oscillatory phenomena that occurs in high
frequencies.
In general, these parameters are computed for both the
upstream uniform and the downstream backwater part of the
canal, and they are then merged into the so-called equivalent
parameters, which describe the whole pool. Nevertheless, in
the considered case study, the bed slope is 0 (flat canal),
which means that there is no uniform flow20. Therefore,
the parameters must only be computed for the backwater
part (using the total length of the reach), and no merging
formulas are needed afterward. Furthermore, as the canal
presents null bottom slope, some parameters are not needed,
and the general expressions of some other parameters can be
simplified.
The formulas that are used to compute the parameters of
the model (1) in the case of a flat canal are given below:
τ12 =
L
C0 + V0
(3a)
τ21 =
L
C0 − V0 (3b)
z11 =
1
T0C0(1− F0)
√√√√1 + ( 1−F01+F0)2 eαL
1 + eαL
(3c)
z12 =
2
T0C0(1− F02)
e
− Lγ0
2T0(C02−V02)√
1 + eαL
(3d)
z21 =
2
T0C0(1− F02)
e
Lγ0
2T0(C02−V02)√
1 + eαL
(3e)
z22 =
1
T0C0(1 + F0)
√√√√1 + ( 1+F01−F0)2 eαL
1 + eαL
(3f)
A11 = A12 =
T0
2
(
C0
2 − V02
)
γ0
(
e
γ0L
T0(C02−V02) − 1
)
(3g)
A21 = A22 =
T0
2
(
C0
2 − V02
)
γ0
(
1− e−
γ0L
T0(C02−V02)
)
(3h)
with L [m] the length of the reach, C0 [m/s] the water
celerity, V0 [m/s] the average water velocity, T0 [m] the
top width, F0 (dimensionless) the Froude number, α [m−1]
and γ0 [m2s−2] two geometrical coefficients. Some of these
parameters must be evaluated in a precise spatial abscissa
of the reach; in this case, the value x = L/2 is used, except
where otherwise noted.
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In order to compute the parameters (3a)–(3h), the
following expressions must be used:
C0 =
√
gA0
T0
(4a)
V0 =
Q0
A0
(4b)
F0 =
V0
C0
(4c)
α = − T0
A0F0
(
1− F02
)[2 + (K0 − 1)F02
−
(
A0
T0
2
dT0
dY
+ κ0 − 2
)
F0
4
]
(4d)
γ0 = V0
2 ∂T0
∂x
− gT0
[
1 + κ0 − (κ0 − 2)F02
]∂Y0
∂x
(4e)
κ0 =
7
3
− 4A0
3T0P0
∂P0
∂Y
(4f)
∂Y0
∂x
=
−sf0(x)
1− F02(x)
(4g)
sf0(x) =
Q0
2n2
A0
2(x)R0
4/3(x)
(4h)
R0 =
A0
P0
(4i)
with g [ms−2] the gravitational acceleration, A0 [m2] the
wetted area, κ0 and sL (dimensionless) two geometrical
coefficients linked to the shape of the reach, Y0 [m] the
water depth, x [m] the position along the reach, sf0
(dimensionless) the friction slope,Q0 [m3s−1] the reference
discharge across section A0, n [sm−1/3] the roughness
coefficient, R0 [m] the hydraulic radius and P0 [m] the
wetted perimeter. The derivatives dT0dY ,
∂T0
∂x ,
∂Y0
∂x and
∂P0
∂Y can
be computed according to the geometry of the reach.
The following transfer functions are obtained when the
expressions (3a)–(3h) and (4a)–(4i) are used:
pˆ11 =
6928s+ 1
2.2 · 106s (5a)
pˆ12 =
−9544s− 1
2.2 · 106s e
−6930s (5b)
pˆ21 =
9544s+ 1
2.2 · 106s e
−6920s (5c)
pˆ22 =
−6928s− 1
2.2 · 106s (5d)
A reference discharge Q0 = 0.6m3/s and a roughness
coefficient n = 0.035 have been considered in the present
case.
The performance of this model is compared with the
results obtained using the hydraulic simulator SICˆ2 (http:
//sic.g-eau.net), developed at IRSTEA Montpel-
lier21. SICˆ2 solves numerically the Saint-Venant equations
without simplification. Hence, the results provided by this
software will be taken as the reference to check the predictive
power of the computed IDZ model. The predictive power
of the IDZ model has already been tested and validated in
different realistic scenarios for the CFr22.
It will be seen later how the IDZ model predicts the correct
downstream water level, but it is not the case for the upstream
water level. This mismatch in the estimation of the upstream
water level is corrected by means of the following calibration
strategy:
pˆ
′
ij(s) =
kij · zijs+ 1
Aijs e
−τijs, (6)
where kij are the calibration coefficients. Notice that only
the zeros are calibrated: indeed, the mismatch between
the reference and the IDZ model mainly affects the peak
response, for which the zero accounts. Therefore, this
calibration aims at reproducing the peak magnitude with
more accuracy.
The models are calibrated for the Fontinettes lock
operation, as it involves the largest water volume dispatch.
The calibrated IDZ model for the upstream water level is:
pˆ
′
11(s) =
5995s+ 1
2.2 · 106s (7a)
pˆ
′
12(s) =
−7003s− 1
2.2 · 106s e
−6930s (7b)
Since the downstream water level was correctly predicted
from the beginning, no calibration is needed for the first two
terms. Therefore, pˆ
′
21(s) = pˆ21(s) and pˆ
′
22(s) = pˆ22(s).
Figure 4 shows the evolution of the water level at the
upstream and downstream ends for the reference, the original
uncalibrated IDZ model (5) and the calibrated IDZ model
(7). Notice that only the first peak in the response is shown.
Indeed, a lock operation is simulated in Fontinettes at t = 0.5
h, whose effect can be observed in Cuinchy after τd (at
t ≈ 2.5 h), which is the time required for a perturbation to
travel from the downstream to the upstream end. It is shown
that the calibrated model provides a more accurate prediction
of the upstream water level.
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Figure 4. Evolution of the water levels for the Fontinettes lock
operation.
4 Fault diagnosis
A fault diagnosis method for the CFr based on the flat
navigation canals model presented in Section 3 is proposed.
Fault diagnosis is usually divided in two parts: fault detection
and fault isolation.
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4.1 Fault detection
Model-based fault detection is built on checking the
consistency between the measured inputs and outputs from a
system and the behavior described by a model of the faultless
system. The presence of a fault is proved when the model
of the faultless system is not consistent with the available
measurements. The model of the system should describe the
behavior of the system in any non-faulty scenario and also in
faulty scenarios where the fault can be modeled by a change
of model parameters or variables.
In the case of the use of qualitative models, i.e.
mathematical models that can be described in time or
frequency domain, the fault diagnosis is usually based on
the evaluation of a temporal residual r(t)23–25. Also known
as analytical redundancy, a temporal residual is computed as
the difference between the real observed behavior of a system
y(t) provided by sensors and the predicted yˆ(t) by the model,
i.e.
r(t) = y(t)− yˆ(t) (8)
In an ideal case, residuals should only be different from
zero when the system is affected by a fault. However,
due to modeling errors, sensor noises and disturbances,
the residuals can be different from zero in non-faulty
scenarios. Therefore, residual-based fault detection methods
must consider this fact (should be robust) in order to avoid
false alarms.
A passive robust fault detection method can be
implemented by means of the computation of the maximum
positive and negative deviations (bounds σ and σ) of the
residual r(t) in the time domain from zero in a non-faulty
scenario. Therefore, the values of the bounds are directly
linked to the accuracy of the model. The fault detection test
can be formulated as:
φ(t) =
{
0 if r(t) ∈ [σ, σ]⇒ No Fault
1 otherwise
(9)
The main drawback of the fault detection test defined
by (9) is that some faults whose effect in the residual is
not large enough to reach the threshold are not detected
(undetected faults). This means that a minimum fault
magnitude is necessary to guarantee its detection. This
minimum detectable fault guarantees that the residual
reaches its threshold (triggering limit)23 despite of model
uncertainties.
4.2 Fault isolation
Fault isolation usually requires the evaluation of a set of
residuals r1, . . . , rnr that derives a set of fault signals
φ1, . . . , φnr computed, for instance, by means of (9). In this
paper, the fault isolation strategy that will be used is based
on previous works26,27 (see Fig. 5).
First, a memory component updates cyclically the fault
signal occurrence provided by the fault detection algorithm.
When a fault is detected, the information of the different fault
signals are stored in a table. This information consists of
the first fault signal activation time to, the activation time
of the other signals ti that are activated in the time window
t ∈ [to, to + Tw] (where Tw is a prefixed waiting time) and
the maximum activation value φi,max for every fault signal
new event 
occurred?
update 
memory
residuals 
evaluation
evaluation 
factor01
evaluation 
factortime
evaluation 
factororder
decision
logic
Memory 
Component
diagnosed 
fault
Time series 
interficie  
Component
Decision logic  
Component
Figure 5. Fault isolation components.
φi i = 1, ..., nr in this time window computed as:
φi,max(t) = max
l∈[to,t]
|φi(l)| (10)
with t ≤ to + TW where Tw must be chosen as the largest
transient time response Tlt from a fault-free scenario to any
faulty scenario. The advantage of using maximum activation
values φi,max(t) computed by (10) instead of temporal fault
signals φi(t) is that the undesirable effect of non-persistent
fault indicators, sensor noises and disturbances is minimized.
Once a new event has been detected in the memory
component, different time series analysis are carried out
to compare the observed fault behavior with the different
considered fault patterns. In the fault isolation module
described in Fig. 5, three different analysis are considered.
One is the standard static Boolean analysis (denoted as
factor01(t)), where a Boolean fault signal activation matrix
(FSM01) that contains information about the incidence or no
incidence of faults (columns) on residuals (rows) is used to
determine which is the most probable fault. The probability
of a fault is determined by the match between the columns
of the FSM01 matrix and a vector whose components are
φi,max i = 1, ..., nr. factor01j is calculated for all the fault
hypotheses j = 1, ..nf in the following way:
factor01j(t) =
nr∑
i=1
(φi,max(t)FSM01ij)
nr∑
i=1
FSM01ij
zvfj(t) (11)
where zvfj is a zero-violation-factor defined as
zvfj(t) =

0 if ∃i ∈ {1, ...,nr} ,with FSM01ij = 0
and φi,max(t) = 1
1 otherwise
(12)
The fault signal occurrence order analysis (denoted as
factororder) compares the order of activation of the different
fault signals with the expected order for all the considered
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faults stored in the matrix (FSMorder). factororderj is
calculated for all the fault hypotheses j = 1, ..nf in the
following way:
factororderj(t) =
=
nr∑
i=1
(order (φi,max(t),FSMorderij))
nr∑
i=1
boolean(FSMorderij)
· zvforderj(t)
(13)
where
order(φi,max(t),FSMorderij) =
=
{
0, order(φi,max(t)) 6= FSMorderij
1, order(φi,max(t)) = FSMorderij
(14)
and zvforderj(t) is defined as zvfj(t) in (12) but excluding
those fault hypotheses that do not coincide in the order.
The time occurrence analysis (denoted as factortime)
checks the consistency of the delay between the different
fault activation signals and the time of the first fault signal
activation time to and the expected one stored in the matrix
(FSMtime), whose components are computed as
FSMtimeij =
{
[τ ij , τ¯ij ] if FSMij = 1
[−1,−1] if FSMij = 0
(15)
where [τ ij , τ¯ij ] is the time interval in which the fault signal
φi caused by fault fj is expected to appear. factortimej
is calculated for all the fault hypotheses j = 1, ..nf in the
following way:
factortimej(t) =
=
nr∑
i=1
(checktime (tφi, tref ,FSMtimeij))
nr∑
i=1
boolean(FSMtimeij)
· zvforderj(t)
(16)
where tφi is the apparition time instant of the fault signal
φi(t), tref is the apparition time instant of the first observed
fault signal
checktime (tφi, tref ,FSMtimeij) =
=
{
0 if tφi − tref /∈ FSMtimeij
1 if tφi − tref ∈ FSMtimeij
(17)
boolean(FSMtimeij) =
{
0 if FSMtimeij = [−1,−1]
1 if FSMtimeij 6= [−1,−1]
(18)
Finally, the most probable fault among all the possible
candidates is selected by means of a decision logic block,
considering the result of the different time-series analysis.
A factortotalj is calculated for all the fault hypotheses j =
1, ..nf in the following way:
factortotalj(t) = factor01j(t) + factororderj(t)+
+ factortimej(t)
(19)
Then, the most probable fault can be computed as
fˆ(t) = arg max
∀j=1,...,nf
factortotalj(t) (20)
The isolation decision must be made in a time not greater
than the waiting time Tw, i.e. t ≤ to + TW , which can be
computed as
Tw = max∀i,j
(τ ij) (21)
During this period of time, a likelihood index Pj(t) for
every fault hypothesis j = 1, ..nf can be computed as
Pj(t) =
factortotalj(t)
nf∑
i=1
factortotali(t)
(22)
4.3 Fault diagnosis in the CFr system
Two different residuals rC(t) and rF (t) can be generated
for the CFr from the difference between the available level
measurements in Cuinchy and Fontinettes (yC(t) and yF (t))
and the level estimations (yˆC(t) and yˆF (t)). They can be
computed using (1) with:
yˆC(t) = L
−1{y(0, s)} and yˆF (t) = L −1{y(L, s)} (23)
and considering that
q(0, s) = L {qC(t)} and q(L, s) = L {qF (t)}, (24)
where L {} is the Laplace transform, and qC(t) and qF (t)
are the total flows in Cuinchy and Fontinettes, respectively.
These flows are computed as the sum of the flows through
the hydraulic equipment (gates and locks). In the case of
Cuinchy, there is a lock with a known operation profile
qlockC (t) and a controlled gate with the known input uC(t).
On the other hand, there is only a lock with a known
operation profile qlockF (t) in Fontinettes.
The possible faults that can impact the CFr are sensor
faults in both level sensors fyC and fyF and actuator faults in
the Cuinchy control gate fuC . The effects of the considered
faults in the different variables involved in the two residual
computations are:
yC(t) = y
0
C(t) + fyC (t)
yF (t) = y
0
F (t) + fyF (t)
qC(t) = qlockC (t) + uC(t) = qlockC (t) + u
0
C(t) + fuC (t)
qF (t) = qlockF (t)
where y0C(t), y
0
F (t) and u
0
C(t) denote actual values of levels
and control gate flow, respectively.
Then, considering the effect of the three faults in the two
residuals, matrices FSM01 (Table 1), FSMorder (Table 2)
and FSMtime (Table 3) can be obtained. The level sensor
faults fyC and fyF only affect the associated level residual.
Thus, the FSMorder matrix does not provide any additional
information to the FSM01 matrix and neither does the
FSMtime matrix, where [-1,-1] denotes no influence of a
fault in a residual27. On the other hand, fuC affects the two
level residuals, first rC and later rF . The time values τ2,3
and τ2,3 denote the minimum and maximum delays from the
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activation of the fault signal in rC to the activation of rF
in the presence of an actuator fault in the Cuinchy control
gate fuC . Therefore, when the fault signal associated to the
Cuinchy level residual is activated, a waiting time Tw = τ2,3
has to be considered in (10) to distinguish between a fault
in the Cuinchy level sensor (fyC ) and an actuator fault in
the Cuinchy control gate (fuC ). The values of τ2,3 and τ2,3
will be around the delay of the transfer function pˆ
′
12(s) (i.e.
6930 s).
fyC fyF fuC
rC 1 0 1
rF 0 1 1
Table 1. FSM01 matrix in the CFr system
fyC fyF fuC
rC 1 0 1
rF 0 1 2
Table 2. FSMorder matrix in the CFr system
fyC fyF fQC
rC 0 [-1,-1] 0
rF [-1,-1] 0 [τ2,3, τ2,3]
Table 3. FSMtime matrix in the CFr system
5 Results
The IDZ models obtained in (7) are used to compute the
results. On the other hand, in order to cope with errors due to
uncertainty in transport delays that are present in open-flow
canal systems, following the ideas of previous works28, the
residual has been computed as
r(t) = y(t)− yˆ(t−∆τ0), (26)
where
∆τ0 = arg min
∆τ∈[−λτ ,λτ ]
|y(t)− yˆ(t−∆τ)|, (27)
with λτ the maximum deviation from the nominal time delay.
Uncertainties in time delays lead to important instanta-
neous errors in level estimations. Figure 6 shows the evo-
lution of residuals computed directly with (8) and applying
(26) in a realistic scenario. Maximum and minimum residual
values in fault-free scenarios have been chosen as residual
bounds σ and σ used in the fault detection procedure (9).
The residual bounds for the two residuals computed directly
and applying (26) by considering λτ = 120 s in (27) are
summarized in Table 4.
Directly Applying ∆τ
σ σ σ σ
rC [m] -0.062 0.052 -0.05 0.042
rF [m] -0.096 0.096 -0.032 0.013
Table 4. Residual fault detection thresholds
All the realistic fault scenarios that can impact the system
have been generated in order to study the performance of the
proposed fault diagnosis method considering FSM01 (Table
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Figure 6. Level residuals rC(t) and rF (t) in a 24-hour
fault-free scenario.
1), FSMorder (Table 2) and FSMtime (Table 3) with τ2,3 =
5900 s and τ2,3 = 7900 s.
With the purpose of avoiding that uncertainty and
modeling errors compensate the fault effects, when a fault
is detected using (9), the residual is computed using (26)
by considering ∆τ0 computed with (27), but changing min
by max. In the following, the results of these three faulty
scenarios are explained in detail.
5.1 Level sensor fault in Cuinchy
An additive fault of 6 cm is simulated at the Cuinchy level
sensor at t ≥ 250 min, emulating a fall of 6 cm of an
ultrasonic sensor from its support arm. Figure 7 shows the
evolution of the two residuals: only rC(t) is activated when
the fault is produced (at t = 250 min). Then, applying (19)
and considering Tables 1, 2 and 3, the Fontinettes sensor
fault hypothesis provides a factortotalj equal to zero and
the Cuinchy sensor and actuator faults hypothesis provide a
factortotalj equal to 3 and 1.5 respectively and therefore the
most probable fault with a likelihood index Pj (22) equal to
6.67 is the Cuinchy sensor fault hypothesis, this hypothesis is
confirmed after the waiting time TW = 7900s with no more
activated signals.
5.2 Level sensor fault in Fontinettes
An additive fault of 6 cm is simulated at the Fontinettes level
sensor at t ≥ 500 min, which emulates a fall of 6 cm of an
ultrasonic sensor from its support arm. Figure 8 shows the
evolution of the two residuals: rF (t) is activated when the
fault is produced (at t = 500 min). Then, applying (19) and
considering Tables 1, 2 and 3, the only fault that provides
a factortotalj different from zero is the Fontinettes sensor
fault and therefore the fault is correctly isolated.
5.3 Actuator fault in Cuinchy
An additive fault of −4 m3/s is simulated at the Cuinchy
control gate at t ≥ 300 min that emulates a partial
obstruction in this gate. Figures 9 and 10 show the residuals
and the fault signals evolution, respectively. The first fault
signal φC(t) is activated at t = 342 min (42 min after
the gate is partially blocked). Later, at t = 442 min, the
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Figure 7. Water level residuals rC(t) and rF (t) in a sensor
fault scenario: Cuinchy level fault fyC (t) = 6 cm at t ≥ 250
min
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Figure 8. Water level residuals rC(t) and rF (t) in a sensor
fault scenario: Fontinettes level fault fyF (t) = 6 cm at t ≥ 500
min.
fault signal φF (t) is activated. Then, during 100 min (from
t = 342min to t = 442min), there are two fault candidates
(fyC and fuC ) according to Tables 1, 2 and 3, which provide
likelihood indices (22) equal to 0.67 and 0.33, respectively.
However, after the activation of φF (t), only fuC is consistent
with the observed fault signals, factortotalj different from
zero. The fault diagnosis procedure works despite the signal
faults are intermittently activated, thanks to the memory
component (10) and Table 3.
6 Conclusions
A diagnosis method was proposed in this paper to detect
and isolate sensor and actuator faults that can occur in
flat navigation canals. Fault diagnosis in these systems is
required to avoid the navigation disruption. Indeed, the
navigation is allowed only if the level of each reach is inside
a navigation rectangle defined by two boundaries around
the NNL. The proposed diagnosis method was designed
based on the IDZ model, which is able to reproduce the
peaks introduced by the significant magnitude of the lock
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Figure 9. Level residuals rC(t) and rF (t) in an actuator fault
scenario: Cuinchy fault fuC (t) = −4m3/s at t ≥ 300min
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Figure 10. Instantaneous activation signals φC(t) and φF (t) in
an actuator fault in Cuinchy (fuC (t) = −4m3/s at t ≥ 300
min)
operations. Specifically, only flat canals like the CFr were
considered, thus dealing with a particular flow profile to test
the proposed modeling and fault diagnosis approaches. The
considered faulty scenarios correspond to all the possible
faults that can impact the system. They are based on
realistic operating conditions and are built to highlight the
performance of the proposed diagnosis approach.
The results show that all the faults can be correctly
detected, and the faulty component can be successfully
isolated in all scenarios. In the case of sensor faults, only
one residual is activated, which makes the diagnosis task
easier. In the case of a fault in the downstream actuator,
the activation of two fault signals (at different time instants)
is consistent with only one possible fault, which allows
to isolate the faulty component. Notice that each of the
presented scenarios considers only one fault. Indeed, the
next step derived from this work will address simultaneous
fault occurrences. Furthermore, this diagnosis approach must
be improved to deal with the strong disturbances that
characterize real environmental systems.
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